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COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. AVIALL SERVICES, INC.: TIME FOR 
A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO RESTORE VOLUNTARY 
REMEDIATION 
NANCY KUBASEK* & JAY THREET** 
INTRODUCTION 
At a time when much of the current rhetoric from the Environmental 
Protection Agency emphasizes voluntary compliance, and when the number of 
annual completed hazardous waste site cleanups is significantly declining,1 the 
United States Supreme Court handed down a surprising decision that is likely 
to dramatically curtail voluntary cleanups of contaminated property2 unless 
Congress steps in3 and amends the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).4  In the December 2004 case of 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,5 the United States Supreme 
Court overturned settled case law that allowed the owner of contaminated 
property to voluntarily remediate the property and then seek contribution from 
other potentially responsible parties,6 a decision that will impose significant 
 
* Professor of Business Law and Environmental Law, Bowling Green State University.  J.D., 
University of Toledo College of Law; B.A., Education, Bowling Green State University. 
** J.D. candidate, University of Toledo College of Law, 2009; M.B.A., Bowling Green State 
University, 2006. 
 1. The number of completed CERCLA cleanups in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 has 
decreased by 50 percent since the late-1990s. U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND & SIERRA CLUB, THE 
TRUTH ABOUT TOXIC WASTE CLEANUPS: HOW EPA IS MISLEADING THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE 
SUPERFUND PROGRAM 6 (2004), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/toxics/factsheets/ 
leanups.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). 
 2. See, e.g., Supreme Court Limits contribution Claims Under CERCLA, AllBusiness.com, 
http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-michigan-metro-areas-lansing/911506-
1.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). 
 3. Some commentators do not believe that congressional intervention to save CERCLA is 
likely.  Citing congressional refusal to reauthorize the tax that helped fund CERCLA since its 
expiration in 1995, some commentators argue that the focus should be on revitalizing state 
Brownfield legislation to clean up severely contaminated sites.  See, e.g., David A. Dana, State 
Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 89 (2005). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000). 
 5. 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
 6. See Robert Longstreth, Supreme Court Decision Imperils Voluntary Environmental 
Cleanups, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, March 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 3312112 (stating, 
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costs on property owners who are trying to be good citizens by fulfilling their 
legal obligations under CERCLA without waiting for a lawsuit to force them 
into compliance.  And what was almost as surprising as the Court’s decision 
itself was the fact that despite the Bush administration’s vocal public support 
for voluntary action over government enforcement, the United States Attorney 
General filed an amicus curiae brief7 urging the Court to render this 
unexpected verdict.8  Not surprisingly, twenty-three states and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico joined together and filed an amicus brief urging 
the opposite outcome.9 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted CERCLA10 in 1980 “to facilitate the prompt cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites and to shift the cost of environmental response from the 
taxpayers to the parties who benefitted [sic] from the wastes that caused the 
 
“Federal court decisions over the past two decades had firmly established that a party incurring 
costs to investigate and remediate contaminated property could bring a contribution action to 
recover some or all of these costs under the federal Superfund law . . . .”). 
 7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cooper Indus., Inc. 
v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192). 
 8. There are two key reasons why it is confusing that the Attorney General urged for this 
verdict: 
First, under the current administration, the Department of Justice has dropped a number of 
“adversarial” lawsuits in the environmental area, preferring instead to rely on industry to 
voluntarily come into compliance with environmental regulations, so it seems illogical for 
the Attorney General to argue on behalf of a decision that would discourage the very kind 
of voluntary compliance the Department of Justice had been advocating.  Second, 
historically, federal and state environmental agencies have relied on private parties to 
“voluntarily” clean up thousands of sites and then utilize private contributions actions to 
work out the allocation of cleanup costs with other potentially responsible parties (PRPs) 
without the government having to use its scarce Superfund resources to file actions to 
force these cleanups.  And because Congress has failed to reauthorize the tax that had 
previously provided much of the funding for enforcement actions under CERCLA, the 
government is now able to bring even fewer of these actions, meaning that without 
voluntary cleanups, more contaminated property will remain contaminated for longer 
periods of time. 
Nancy Kubasek, From the Environment, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 98, 107 n.4 (2005); see Douglas 
McLeod, Superfund Lawsuits Limited: Common Pollution Cleanup Action Barred, BUS. INS., 
Dec. 20, 2004 (citing numerous environmental law attorneys who argue that the decision will, at 
minimum, slow voluntary cleanups). 
 9. Brief of the States of New York, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming, and The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192) [hereinafter Amici 
Brief of the States]. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000). 
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harm.”11  CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),12  is often celebrated as “a vital program 
to safeguard human health and the environment from the toxic consequences of 
decades of irresponsible waste handling.”13 
The legislative format created by CERCLA provides two options for 
cleaning up contaminated sites: the federal government may choose to clean up 
a contaminated area itself,14 or alternatively, it may compel responsible parties 
to undertake the cleanup.15  In either case, the Government may recover its 
response costs under § 107, the so-called “cost recovery” section of 
CERCLA.16  Section 107(a) lists four classes of potentially responsible persons 
(PRPs) and provides that they “shall be liable” for, among other things, “all 
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States 
Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.”17  
Section 107(a) further provides that PRPs shall be liable for “any other 
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person . . . not inconsistent 
with the national contingency plan.”18 
When CERCLA was amended in 1986,19 it provided an express cause of 
action for contribution in § 113(f)(1).20  This section, the interpretation of 
which is the focus of Cooper Industries, provides: 
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or 
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any 
civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this 
title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In 
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among 
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are 
appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to 
bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 
9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.21 
 
 11. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 12. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986). 
 13. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & GREGORY S. WEBER, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES IN A NUTSHELL 256 (1997). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2000). 
 15. Id. § 9606(a). 
 16. Id. § 9607(a). 
 17. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
 18. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
 19. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1986)). 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
 21. Id. § 9613(f)(1). 
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Section 113(f)(3)(B) of CERCLA provided incentives for PRPs to enter 
into judicially approved or administrative settlements with the United States or 
individual states by providing that any party who resolved its liability through 
such settlements would be allowed to seek contribution from other PRPs.22  
Such a party also could not be held liable for claims by non-settling PRPs “for 
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”23   
Since the passage of CERCLA, litigation has arisen over the issue of 
whether a private party that has incurred response costs, but that has done so 
voluntarily and is not itself subject to suit, has a cause of action for cost 
recovery against other PRPs.  A number of courts have held that § 
107(a)(4)(B) and its predecessors authorize such a cause of action.24 
Other litigation has questioned whether a private entity that has been sued 
in a cost recovery action by the Government or by another PRP can obtain 
contribution from other PRPs, even though CERCLA contains no provision 
explicitly granting a right for contributions.  Several district courts have found 
that such a right arises either impliedly from the provisions of the statute,25 or 
as a matter of federal common law,26 even though CERCLA, as originally 
enacted, contained no provision expressly providing for a right of action for 
contribution under such circumstances.  The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all allowed contribution suits under § 113(f) 
without a prior § 106 or § 107 action.27  In light of all of these decisions, the 
 
 22. See id. § 9613(f)(2). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(noting that the absence of an enforcement action against Wickland under CERCLA did not 
“render the controversy between Wickland and [another potentially responsible party] remote and 
hypothetical.”); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that 
allowing a private party to “recover response costs from responsible parties . . . is consistent with 
both the language . . . and the congressional purpose underlying CERCLA as a whole.”); 
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that an 
“action is not barred because of some theoretical inconsistencies with statutory provisions which 
have not been made operative in this case.”). 
 25. Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (arguing that 
a contribution right is implicit in § 9607(e)(2)). 
 26. United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (D. Del. 1986) (noting 
that “[t]he CERCLA liability provision . . . leaves little room for doubt that Congress intended the 
liability provision . . . to be employed as a major tool to facilitate cleanup.”); Colorado v. 
ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486–92 (D. Colo. 1985). 
 27. See, e.g., W. Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 683–84 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2002); Crofton Ventures 
Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); Kalamazoo River Study Group v. 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 274 F.3d 1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 2001); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 
416, 422 (2d Cir. 1998); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1998); 
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Supreme Court’s holding in Cooper Industries was a dramatic reinterpretation 
of CERCLA.28 
Prior to Cooper Industries, two of the most common precursors to 
contribution actions were not civil suits, but rather arose under the Unilateral 
Administrative Order (UAO) and the Administrative Order on Consent 
(AOC);29 the former is an administrative order to conduct a cleanup, with strict 
penalties available for non-performance, and the latter is an order that arises by 
an agreement among the responsible parties and the government.30  Those who 
did the cleanup subject to the UAO or AOC would then sue other PRPs to 
recover part of their costs.31  As the next section demonstrates, such actions 
may no longer be a common tool. 
II.  COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. V. AVIALL SERVICES, INC. 
This case originated when the buyer of an aircraft maintenance business, 
Aviall Services, filed an action under CERCLA against the seller, Cooper 
Industries, for contribution for environmental cleanup costs that Aviall had 
voluntarily undertaken.32 Cooper Industries had owned and operated four 
aircraft maintenance sites until 1981, when Aviall Services bought the sites.33  
After operating the sites for a number of years, Aviall discovered that both it 
and the seller, Cooper Industries, had contaminated the facilities when 
petroleum and other hazardous substances leaked into the groundwater through 
spills and underground storage tank leaks.34  Following the law, Aviall notified 
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission of the contamination 
and was notified by the Commission that it should clean up the site.35  The 
company was informed that if it did not clean up the site, an enforcement 
action would be brought against it.36  However, neither the Commission nor 
the EPA actually took any judicial or administrative actions to force a 
cleanup.37 
 
United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995); Wickland Oil 
Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 28. 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
 29. Richard F. Ricci, Cooper Industries Inc. v. Aviall Services Inc.: Whither (Or Is It Wither) 
Superfund?, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2005, at 1, 18. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  The author also notes that since Cooper Industries, at least one district court has 
found that contribution actions could not be brought based on cleanups performed under a UAO 
or AOC.  Id. 
 32. See Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 163–164. 
 33. See id. at 164. 
 34. See id. at 160–65 (offering a detailed explanation of the background facts of the case). 
 35. Id. at 164. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Cooper Indust., 543 U.S. at 164. 
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In 1984, Aviall began to clean up the site under the supervision of the state 
of Texas.38  In 1995 and 1996, Aviall sold the properties to a third party, but 
remained contractually liable for the cleanup.39  In August of 1997, facing 
liability of approximately $5 million in cleanup costs, Aviall filed a claim for 
cost recovery under CERCLA § 107(a), a claim for contribution under 
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), and various state law claims.40 
Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s holding that a § 113 claim is a type of § 107 
claim,41 the company subsequently amended its complaint to state a single 
CERCLA claim.42  Aviall alleged that it was entitled to contribution from 
Cooper, as a PRP under CERCLA § 107, for response costs and other liability 
that it had incurred to clean up the Texas facilities.43 
Both Aviall and Cooper filed for summary judgment, and the District 
Court granted Cooper’s motion, holding that Aviall had abandoned its § 107 
claim and that it was not entitled to recover under § 113 because Aviall had not 
previously been sued under CERCLA § 106 or § 107.44 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s decision.45  The majority held that, “a PRP seeking contribution 
from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1) must have a pending or adjudged § 106 
administrative order or § 107(a) cost recovery action against it.”46 
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed by a divided vote, holding 
that § 113(f)(1) allows a PRP to obtain contribution from other PRPs 
regardless of whether the PRP has previously been sued under § 106 or § 
107.47  The court held that “ [s]ection 113(f)(1) authorizes suits against PRPs 
in both its first and last sentence[,] which states without qualification that 
‘nothing’ in the section shall ‘diminish’ any person’s right to bring a 
contribution action in the absence of a § 106 or § 107(a) action.”48  The court 
reasoned in part that the word “may” in § 113(f)(1) did not mean “may only.”49  
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 924 (5th Cir. 2000); see also 
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 349–53 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek Group 
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301–02 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 42. See Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 164. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 164–65.  The district court also declined to hear Aviall’s state law claims 
because its federal law claims were dismissed.  Id. at 164. 
 45. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001), overruled by 
Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 46. Id. at 145. 
 47. Aviall, 312 F.3d at 677. 
 48. Id. at 681. 
 49. Id. at 686–687. 
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Three members of the en banc court dissented, arguing that the majority’s 
reading of the statute was not supported by the statute’s text or its structure.50 
On December 13, 2004, the United States Supreme Court overturned the 
Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision, holding that a potentially responsible party 
cannot maintain a contribution action unless such contribution is sought either 
during or after a Superfund action has been filed in federal court, or the PRP 
has resolved its liability to the state or federal government in an administrative 
or judicial settlement.51 
The majority on the Court reached this decision by strictly interpreting the 
language of the statute.  In explaining why § 113(f)(1) does not authorize 
Aviall’s suit, Justice Thomas wrote: 
The first sentence, the enabling clause that establishes the right of contribution, 
provides: “Any person may seek contribution . . . during or following any civil 
action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title,” 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added). The natural meaning of this sentence is 
that contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, 
namely, “during or following” a specified civil action.52 
A majority of the United States Supreme Court was not convinced by the 
reasoning of Aviall and the Fifth Circuit that the word “may” was permissive, 
and did not mean “only.”53  To the contrary, Justice Thomas explained that if § 
113(f)(1) was intended to authorize contribution actions at any time, then 
Congress would not have included the explicit “during or following”54 
conditional language, and noted that the Court avoids statutory interpretations 
that render part of a statute’s language superfluous.55 
Justice Thomas also found that the savings clause in the last sentence of § 
113(f)(1), which states that, “[n]othing in this subsection shall diminish the 
right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil 
action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title,”56 is not 
intended to create any additional causes of action other of those “during or 
following a civil action.”57  Rather, the sentence simply “rebuts any 
presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling 
clause is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP.”58 
As further support for the majority’s interpretation of the statute, Justice 
Thomas cited the lack of any statutory time limit during which an action based 
 
 50. See id. at 691 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
 51. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 165–66 (2004). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 166–168. 
 54. Id. at 165–166. 
 55. Id. at 166; see also United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35 (1992). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000). 
 57. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167. 
 58. Id. at 166–67. 
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on a voluntary cleanup can be brought.59  He pointed out that there are two 
specific situations in which contribution can be sought: “‘during or following’ 
specified civil actions” under § 113(f)(1), and “after an administrative or 
judicially approved settlement that resolves liability to the United States or a 
State.”60  For the former actions, there is a three-year time limit to commence 
suit, which begins to run on the date of the judgment,61 and for the latter there 
is a three-year limitations period that begins to run on the date of settlement.62  
Nowhere in the statute is there a limitations period for the commencement of 
contribution actions based on voluntary cleanups, and therefore, Justice 
Thomas concluded that such actions must not have been contemplated by 
Congress.63 
The decision in this case, however, was not as destructive to PRP rights as 
it could have been.  The Court did leave a couple issues unresolved that might 
ultimately provide a route for some PRPs to recover.  The Court noted in a 
footnote, for example, that it was not addressing the issue of whether a party 
that has received a unilateral administrative order by the EPA under § 106, 
unaccompanied by an enforcement lawsuit under § 106, would be able to 
pursue contribution under § 113(f)(1).64 
Aviall could not persuade the Court to consider an alternative implied right 
of recovery from Cooper under § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.65  The Court 
chose to leave this issue unresolved 66 because Aviall had neglected to raise the 
issue in the lower courts.67 Even if Aviall had raised the issue in the lower 
 
 59. Id. at 167.  In their brief, the States had urged the Court not to rely too heavily on the 
lack of a specific limitations period for the commencement of suits by those doing voluntary 
cleanups because “when CERCLA was enacted in 1980 and amended in 1986, it was far from 
unusual for Congress to create a cause of action but fail to provide a pertinent period of 
limitations, thereby leaving it to the courts to ‘borrow’ an appropriate applicable period from 
other sources of law.” Amici Brief of the States, supra note 9, at 7. 
 60. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (G)(3)(A) (2000). 
 62. Id. § 9613(g)(3)(B). 
 63. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167. 
 64. Id. at 168, n.5.  For further discussion of this unresolved issue, see Christopher P. Davis, 
United States: Navigating the CERCLA Contribution Landscape in the Aftermath of Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Jan. 2005, available at 2005 
WLNR 1804060. 
 65. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 170–71 (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630, 638–47 (1981) and Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 
77, 90–99 (1981)).  The Court has previously refused to read an implied right of contribution into 
federal statutes.  See Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91–95. 
 66. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 168–69. 
 67. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 109 (2001) for the 
proposition that “[w]e ordinarily do not decide, in the first instance issues not decided below”). 
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courts, it is safe to assume that the lower courts would have relied on the 
Court’s previous precedent, and not found an implied right of recovery.68 
As the lawyer representing Cooper Industries pointed out, many states 
have laws that allow parties who voluntarily clean up a site to seek 
contributions from others who contributed to the contamination.69  However, 
although contribution actions can still be brought under state law, the Court’s 
interpretation of the “savings clause” in § 113(f)(1) leaves a void in the federal 
hazardous waste cleanup efforts. 
III.  STATE SOLUTIONS TO THE CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 
A private party can attempt to obtain contribution through state law, but 
there is a risk that state law contribution schemes may be pre-empted by 
CERCLA.70  Currently, twenty-seven states have addressed the problem of 
hazardous waste through legislation on voluntary remediation.  These states go 
beyond defining a “responsible party” or mirroring CERCLA in their 
respective environmental management laws.  Though they attack the problem 
of voluntary remediation differently, it can be said that they are headed in the 
right direction.  One can only hope the federal government will follow in 
rewarding voluntary remediation instead of discouraging it. 
Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana have recognized that encouraging the 
voluntary remediation and redevelopment of property is in their states’ 
respective interest.  Alabama has established a revolving fund program to 
“encourage and assist the assessment, remediation, and redevelopment of 
previously used property which is contaminated or perceived to be 
contaminated.”71  Florida allows those who voluntarily remediate their site to 
apply for compensation through their Inland Protection Trust Fund.72  The 
route chosen by these states, although encouraging from an environmental 
perspective, leaves the taxpayers financially responsible for the remediation. 
Louisiana has chosen to give tax credit for voluntary remediation of 
hazardous waste.73  This legislation may be in response to the “[h]azardous 
 
 68. Several appellate courts have held that a PRP is limited solely to a claim for contribution 
under CERCLA § 113.  See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2nd Cir. 1998); 
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 
1998) (stating that PRPs must seek contribution under CERCLA § 113). 
 69. See infra, Part III (discussing state law solutions to cleanup of hazardous waste). 
 70. See In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1997); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d 
at 425–27. 
 71. ALA. CODE § 22-30F-2 (2005). 
 72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.3071 (2006). 
 73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6021.  Louisiana’s Brownfield cleanup tax credit is equal to 
25 percent of the investment in a voluntary remediation of a state-certified contaminated site, or 
15 percent of the investment in a voluntary remedial investigation.  Id.  Credit can be carried 
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chemicals and substances [that] have been disposed of in Louisiana for many 
years in a manner that, although possibly legal at the time, was careless and 
inappropriate and created conditions which are extremely dangerous and may 
cause long-term health and environmental problems for the people of this 
state.”74 
Nineteen states that have addressed voluntary remediation have extensive 
laws discussing everything from redevelopment of the land to future liability of 
those undertaking voluntary remediation.75  These laws establish programs of 
 
forward for up to ten years.  Id.  This statute became effective July 1, 2005, for tax periods 
beginning after Dec. 31, 2004.  Id. 
 74. Id. at § 30:2271(A)(1) (2005).  The additional purposes of the statute are as follows: 
(2) Hazardous substances are produced and transported on a regular basis around this state 
and there have been numerous recent discharges resulting from accidents which have 
caused extensive damage to the citizens of the state and have caused the state to expend 
large sums to respond to these incidents. 
(3) Those persons generating these substances knew or were in a position to know of the 
hazardous and dangerous nature of the substances which they were producing and knew 
or should have known that improper disposal could have long-term health risks and could 
cause irreversible environmental damage. 
(4) The state cannot and should not bear the costs associated with a private profit making 
venture. 
Id. § 30:2271(A)(2)–(4). 
 75. See Voluntary Remediation Program, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 49-171–49-188 (2005); 
Voluntary Clean-up and Redevelopment Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-301–25-26-311 
(2005); Idaho Land Remediation Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-7201–39-7210 (2002 & Supp. 
2006); Voluntary Remediation of Hazardous Substances and Petroleum Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 
13-25-5-1–13-25-5-23(2000 & Supp. 2005); Voluntary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment 
Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-34,161–65-34,174 (2003 & Supp. 2005); Voluntary Environmental 
Remediation Program, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-510–224.01-532 (2002 & Supp. 2005); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2285–30:2290 (2000 & Supp. 2006); Mississippi Brownfields 
Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-35-1–49-35-27 (2003 & 
Supp. 2005); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 260.565–260.575 (2000 & Supp. 2005); Voluntary Remediation 
Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4G-1–74-4G-12 (2000 Supp. 2005); Comprehensive Environmental 
Cleanup and Responsibility Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-701–75-10-752 (2005); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (establishing a comparative negligence system in assigning fault in 
hazardous waste cases); Oklahoma Brownfields Voluntary Redevelopment Act, OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 27A, §§ 2-, §§ 15-101–15-110 (1997 & Supp. 2006) (stating that Oklahoma’s 
Department of Environmental Quality will issue a certificate of completion for successful 
voluntary remediation programs); Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.  §§ 
6020.101–6020.1305 (2003 & Supp. 2006) (defining the responsible person, scope of liability, 
and defenses to liability in the cleanup of hazardous sites); Brownfield Projects Voluntary 
Cleanup Oversight and Assistance Program, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224 (2001 & Supp. 
2005); Voluntary Remediation Program, VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1232 (2006); Voluntary Waste 
Reduction Plan, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.95C.200 (2002 & Supp. 2006); Voluntary 
Remediation and Redevelopment Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 22-22-1–22-22-21 (2002 & Supp. 2006); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 292.15 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-1601–35-11-1613 (2005). 
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governmental evaluation and step-by-step completion of voluntary 
remediation. 
Three states, California, Oregon, and Rhode Island, have strong statutes 
that take the extra step of determining the liability of not only one who 
voluntarily cleans up a site, but also previous owners who are potentially 
responsible.  California’s Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance 
Account Act76 “explicitly authorizes any [potentially responsible party] that 
has incurred response costs to seek contribution from any other [potentially 
responsible party].”77  It should also be noted that this Act excludes 
“[p]etroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof . . . .”78 
In Oregon, a person who is liable or may be liable may seek contribution 
from others who are liable or may be liable.79  This statute is applicable in 
contracts of leases.80 The contribution costs among liable parties are 
determined by the court.81 
Rhode Island’s Industrial Property Remediation and Reuse Act (IPRRA)82 
is unique in the fact that it was intended to explain portions of the Hazardous 
Waste Management Act83 that may have been unclear.84  The IPRRA explicitly 
refers to previous owners as responsible parties.85  Now the courts have further 
interpreted liability under both statutes to be attached to incidents that occurred 
prior to enactment.86 
 
 76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300–25395.40 (2006). 
 77. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2002).  The 
court went on to note: 
[U]nlike liability under CERCLA, liability under HSAA is not truly joint and severable. 
Any person found liable for costs under HSAA who establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence that only a portion of those costs or expenditures are attributable to that person’s 
actions will be required to pay only for that portion. Liability under HSAA is therefore 
apportioned according to fault. 
Id. at 946. 
 78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25317(a) (2006); see Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
818 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that because gasoline is a crude oil fraction, but is 
not a specifically listed hazardous substance, gasoline is exempt from the Act). 
 79. OR. REV. STAT. § 465.257 (2005). 
 80. See Newell v. Weston, 946 P.2d 691, 701 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).  In this case, the trial 
court allocated all of the remediation costs to the defendant because the evidence showed that the 
release of gasoline took place entirely during the defendant’s lease term from a tank that the 
defendant had installed, and that the defendant had refused to participate in the remediation.  Id. 
 81. OR. REV. STAT. § 465.257(1) (2005). 
 82. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.14-1–23-19.14-19 (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 83. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.1-1–23-19.1-36 (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 84. See Charter Int’l Oil Co. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 104 (D. R.I. 1996) (arguing that 
the Hazardous Waste Management Act includes previous owners as responsible parties). 
 85. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-6(a)(2) (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 86. See, e.g., Charter Int’l Oil Co., 925 F. Supp. at 109; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-
1 (indicating that the legislative intent was to extend liability under the act to instances in which 
the contamination occurred prior to enactment of this act). 
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New Jersey will also be impacted by the ruling in Cooper Industries since 
its Spill Compensation and Control Act87 is similar to CERCLA.  Buying 
property in states that lack strong environmental laws such as the Spill Act is 
likely to make potential purchasers somewhat reluctant to invest in property 
without receiving adequate representation and indemnification.88  “Without 
such contractual obligations, the former owners may now avoid contributing to 
any cleanup.”89  Now, pre-acquisition environmental audits are even more 
important.90  Therefore, “it is critical that any environmental consultant 
performing such an audit be held accountable for failure to identify 
environmental contamination so that the purchaser [will not] be left 
shouldering all environmental cleanup costs.”91 
States have a strong interest in encouraging cleanups and avoiding 
litigation.  The fact that twenty-three state attorneys general filed an amicus 
brief in support of Aviall Services’ position and urged the Court to affirm the 
Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision indicates that some states are sympathetic to a 
PRP’s right to contribution.92  Because of this, private parties should consult 
with the relevant state agencies for recent pronouncements on how to handle 
such a settlement. 
Such parties should also consider whether § 128 of the Small Business 
Liability and Brownfields Revitalization Act93 might result in their having 
resolved their liability in states that have entered into memoranda of agreement 
(MOAs) with the EPA.  Under such agreements, a party’s participation in the 
state’s voluntary cleanup program precludes the EPA from taking CERCLA 
enforcement action.94 
 
 87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (1992 & Supp. 2006). 
 88. Gerald M. Giordano, Ruling Makes it Harder to Recoup Cleanup Cost; CERCLA 
Contribution at Issue, 14 N.J. LAW., Mar. 21, 2005, at 7, 10. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Amici Brief of the States, supra note 9. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2000). 
 94. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have not entered into a Voluntary Cleanup 
Program MOA with the EPA, while the state of Pennsylvania has entered into an MOA.  See 
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response Office of Brownfields Cleanup and 
Redevelopment, EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS: AN 
UPDATE FROM THE STATES, (Feb. 2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pubs/st_res_prog_report.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005); see 
also One Cleanup Program: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and Region 3 of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/newsletters/2004-04-21.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). 
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IV.  THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO FOLLOW THE CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT 
The Supreme Court chose not to follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit 
that a § 113(f) contribution action was essentially a type of cost recovery 
action under § 107.95  The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning had been mirrored by the 
Tenth Circuit in the case of Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,96 as well as 
by five other circuits.97  The Court decided in Sun Co., Inc. that one starting 
voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste should have a six-year limitations period 
to seek contribution from a PRP.98  The Court was not persuaded by the 
plaintiff’s argument that cleanup costs were not incurred pursuant to a civil 
action under §§ 106 or 107.99  The Court ruled that “if a contribution action is 
not the initial action, then by definition a previous action will have been filed, 
and one of the four triggering events in § 113(g)(3) will occur.”100  There are, 
in effect, two different types of contribution actions under CERCLA, each 
governed by the same rules of § 113(f) and each seeking to equitably allocate 
costs referred to in § 107, but governed by different statutes of limitation.101 
If the Supreme Court had adopted this reasoning in Cooper Industries, the 
Court would have reached a result that was consistent with one of the primary 
goals of CERCLA: the prompt cleanup of dangerous substances.102  Instead, 
we now have a statute that discourages PRPs from removing harmful materials 
from the environment until they are sued. 
The dissenting opinion by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens in Cooper 
Industries criticizes the Court’s refusal to see that § 107(a) “enable[s] a PRP to 
sue other covered persons for reimbursement, in whole or part, of cleanup 
costs the PRP legitimately incurred.”103  Their dissent is well founded.  Nearly 
ten years before Cooper Industries, in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, the 
Court found that § 107(a) enables one to sue for reimbursement.104  What the 
Key Tronic Court could not agree upon was whether the right of action was 
 
 95. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
 96. 124 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 97. See W. Properties Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 683 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 294–95 (4th Cir. 2001); Kalamazoo 
River Study Group v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 274 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2001); Bedford 
Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2d Cir. 1998); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams, Co., 151 
F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 98. Sun Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1192–93. 
 99. Id. at 1192. 
 100. Id. at 1193 (emphasis in original). 
 101. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 806, 816 (1994) (recognizing two 
“similar and somewhat overlapping” contribution actions under §§ 107 and 113). 
 102. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1997). 
 103. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 104. 511 U.S. 806, 816 (1994). 
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express or implied.105 Following this fact pattern, Aviall would have a right to 
contribution.  The dissenters in Cooper Industries, in order to avoid protracting 
the litigation, thought that the Supreme Court should have decided that a 
potentially responsible party like Aviall could recover a proportionate share of 
its costs pursuant to § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA,106 which provides for the 
recovery from the “covered persons” in § 107(a) of “any . . . necessary costs of 
response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan.”107  The majority specifically declined to address that issue and others.108  
Further investigation of the intent behind CERCLA shifts the blame for this 
confusion from the majority of the Court to the legislators on Capitol Hill. 
The issue of recovery under a § 107 claim was raised last year in the 
Southern District of New York.109  In Elementis, the current owner of several 
contaminated sites sought to bring a § 107(a) cost recovery action against the 
former property owner.110  The plaintiff maintained that current Second Circuit 
precedent, set forth in Bedford Affiliates v. Sills,111 precluding a PRP from 
proceeding under § 107(a), is no longer binding in light of the Cooper 
Industries decision.112  The Southern District rejected this argument, holding 
that the Supreme Court in Cooper Industries expressly “withheld judgment 
regarding the correctness of Bedford Affiliates and other decisions of the 
Courts of Appeals.”113  The Southern District further held that, “in the Second 
Circuit, the Supreme Court will not be held to have implicitly expressed an 
opinion on a question which it explicitly declines to address . . . even if the 
Supreme Court’s future expression of that opinion is viewed by some as quite 
likely . . . .”114  “Thus, it appears that the question of how §§ 107 and 113 of 
CERCLA meant to co-exist is still a complicated one that may be taken up by 
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court” soon.115 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 174. 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
 108. For example, the majority did not address whether a § 106 administrative order is a 
“civil action” within the meaning of § 113(f)(1) or what the “savings clause” of § 113(f)(1) saved.  
The majority’s refusal to do so leaves it to the lower courts to resolve such issues. 
 109. Elementis Chems. Inc. v. T H Agric. and Nutrition, L.L.C., 373 F. Supp. 2d 257, 263–
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 110. Id. at 263. 
 111. 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 112. See Elementis, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 113. The Court declined to decide whether a PRP had an implied right of contribution under 
CERCLA § 107.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004). 
 114. Elementis, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 270. 
 115. Richard G. Leland & Toni L. Finger, The Supreme Court’s Limitation On Private Cost 
Recovery Actions Under Superfund: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished—Part II, METRO. CORP. 
COUNSEL: NE. ED., May 2005, at 8. 
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A. Impact of Cooper Industries: Before and After 
Before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cooper Industries, the courts of 
appeals had held that PRPs may sue each other for apportionment of costs 
under § 113 alone,116  or together with § 117.117  The courts of appeals agreed 
that a PRP must sue for contribution under § 113 because such a claim can be 
considered an “initial action of recovery.”118  With the federal appellate courts 
in agreement, it was taken for granted that PRPs had legitimate cost-recovery 
claims under CERCLA. 
Like Aviall, post-Cooper Industries PRPs have run into trouble recovering 
contribution in many cases.  The same federal courts that once held in favor of 
recovery under § 113 are now obligated to follow the Court’s stance from 
Cooper Industries.  The current legal scene makes the recovery process almost 
comical.  A PRP must be sued by the EPA under § 106 or be sued under § 
107(a) in order to bring a contribution suit under § 113(f)(1).  There is some 
mystery as to whether being in the process of settlement with a state agency 
would constitute an “administrative settlement” under § 113.119 
In the first case, the PRP would need to be in the process of an order to be 
sued by the EPA under § 106.  The problems with this route abound.  The PRP 
would initially have to receive an administrative order from the EPA, fail to 
comply with it, and then wait for the EPA to sue.120  Or else, the EPA could 
proceed to conduct the response action on its own, and then seek to recover 
potentially three times the cost of cleanup from the party.121  In this case, the 
noncompliant PRP could be liable for daily penalties of $32,500 per day over 
the course of a cleanup that could last for years.122 
In the case of settlement with a state agency, it is undetermined whether 
conducting a cleanup under state supervision is considered an administrative 
 
 116. Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv. Co. v. 
Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. 
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 
50 F.3d 1530, 1534–36 (10th Cir. 1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
 117. Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). 
“The contours and mechanics of this right are now governed by § 113. Put another way, while § 
107 created the right of contribution, the “machinery” of § 113 governs and regulates such 
actions, providing the details and explicit recognition that were missing from the text of § 107.”  
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122–23 (3d  Cir. 1997). 
 118. Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 924–925 (5th Cir. 2001); Sun Co., 
Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000). 
 120. Id. § 9606(b)(1). 
 121. Id. § 9607(c)(3). 
 122. See Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 7121, 7126 (Feb. 
13, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 19). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
180 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:165 
settlement. This “administrative settlement” is a requirement to bring an action 
for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B).123 
The United States can effectively limit its contribution exposure by 
electing to use enforcement authorities other than civil actions under §§ 106 
and 107.124  This is something private parties do not have the luxury of doing.  
The RCRA citizen suit provision provides that a person may bring suit against 
any person “who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to health or the environment.”125  At least four requirements must be met to 
qualify for contribution rights: 
(1) there must be at least a partial resolution of liability to the United States or 
a state, (2) for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of 
such an action, (3) the resolved liability must be for “response” actions or 
costs, and (4) the resolution of liability must be documented in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement.126 
The problem with fulfilling these requirements is often a procedural one.  The 
EPA and its counterpart state regulatory agencies “lack the resources to grind 
out large numbers of these documents.”127  Even when completed, the 
provision has its limits.  It provides for broad substantive and procedural relief 
including injunctive relief and recovery of attorney fees, but cannot be used to 
recover past costs.128 
B. The EPA’s Role in CERCLA 
The EPA showed a lack of confidence in cleanup activities performed on a 
purely voluntary basis by private PRPs.  It preferred the role of dealing out 
“negotiated settlements” with the agency to reduce future litigation.129  The 
EPA wanted to sanction even voluntary cleanups to ensure the remedial steps 
taken were adequate.130  If not, the PRPs who acted voluntarily could still be 
subject to enforcement action.131 
This is the background for the SARA amendments in 1986.  Thus, the right 
of contribution was, as the Supreme Court affirmed in Cooper Industries, made 
 
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000). 
 124. Examples include § 106 orders and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
enforcement actions. 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 126. William H. Hyatt, Jr. & Emily L. Won, CERCLA Contribution Rights After Cooper 
Industries, METRO. CORP. COUNS., at 14 (Ne. ed. Apr. 2005). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. § 6972(a), (e). 
 129. See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5037–38 (Feb. 5, 1985). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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available under § 113(f)(1) solely to PRPs initiating response actions “during 
or following” enforcement suits under §§ 106 and 107(a).132  Moreover, the 
only other “federal contribution” door opened by SARA allowed one PRP to 
pursue another for an apportionment of cleanup costs under § 113(f)(3)(B), but 
only after the party seeking contribution had first held an administratively or 
judicially approved settlement with the state or federal environmental 
authorities.133 
“The law gives the EPA authority to go after industrial polluters, and it 
also taxes the chemical and petroleum industries to set up a cleanup fund.  If 
no person or party is found liable for a hazardous waste site, Superfund money 
is allocated for clean-up.”134 
Russell Selman, an environmental partner at Katten, Muchin, Zavis, 
Rosenman, believes that consent decrees from the EPA are the only answer for 
his corporate clients if someone else is responsible.135  According to Selman, 
“[p]arties can no longer afford not to do their homework on the assumption 
they can recover their costs down the line.”136  If a party settles with the EPA 
under a consent decree, the party will be able to receive contribution, though 
the EPA more often issues orders through § 106.137 
C. The Department of Defense: A Roadblock to Reversing the Supreme Court 
Within the United States, the Department of Defense (DOD) has left a 
“toxic legacy . . . as a result of [two] centuries of testing, training, [and] 
weapons manufacturing, [ranging] from unexploded bombs to nuclear 
waste.”138  The DOD is the world’s largest polluter, producing more hazardous 
waste per year than the five largest United States chemical companies 
combined.139  Of the 428 Superfund sites in 2004,140 at least 135 were 
federally-owned or operated sites marked for cleanup and remediation as 
National Priorities list cites.141  The federal government faced over $249 
 
 132. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000); see also Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167. 
 134. Tom McCann, Aviall Throws Wrench in Environmental Cleanup Machine, CHI. LAW., 
May, 2005, at 58. 
 135. Id.  “We have clients with anywhere from 10 to 120 polluted sites around the country. 
We’ve submitted them to several federal and state voluntary cleanup programs, and we’re now 
ripping them out and determining if there is anyone we can sue.”  Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 149 Cong. Rec. H1909 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2003) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer). 
 139. Bob Feldman, War on the Earth, DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 24. 
 140. FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPERFUND ANN. REP., at A-1 (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/uperfund/action/process/fy2004.htm.  This number includes all EPA lead 
sites, Potentially Responsible Party lead sites, and Federal Facility sites.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 11. 
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billion in environmental liabilities at the end of fiscal year 2004.142  More than 
$64 billion dollars in those environmental liabilities comes from the DOD 
alone.143 
As Hyatt and Woo point out in an article directed toward corporate 
counsel, since the United States, unlike private parties, will be immune from 
state contribution liability, except at federal facilities, the ruling in Cooper 
Industries would appear to provide the federal government with an entirely 
new defense strategy to avoid CERCLA liability.144 This strategy would be to 
limit its exposure in contribution to the instances in which the United States 
has instituted a § 106 abatement action,145 or when a state or tribe has sued for 
§ 107 cost recoveries.146  These two situations represent a small percentage of 
cleanup activity; the ruling in Cooper Industries has allowed the government to 
cover itself effectively with this strategy.147 
The United States has both an interest in limiting CERCLA’s scope to 
protect itself from liability and a duty to keep its citizens safe from the 
destructive ramifications of hazardous waste.  It is truly a delicate balance.  
The Supreme Court’s ruling limiting the timing of § 113 contribution actions 
results in the federal government’s having to defend fewer CERCLA 
contribution suits.148  Despite the desire to protect the DOD, Congress and the 
Department of Justice149 must put the health and safety of its citizens first. 
 
 142. 2004 FIN. REP. OF THE U.S. GOV., 125, available at http://www.gao.gov/inancial/ 
4frusg.pdf. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Hyatt & Won, supra note 126. 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (2000). 
 146. Hyatt & Won, supra note 126.  CERCLA also provides liability for “all costs of removal 
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not 
inconsistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2000). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 101 (2005) (noting that plaintiff-appellants are not 
eligible to seek contribution under CERCLA § 113(f) unless they have been sued under §§ 106 or 
107(a)); see Steve Seidenberg, Conflicting Rulings Leave Superfund Clean-Ups In Limbo, CORP. 
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2005, at 50 (stating that “[t]he decision has huge ramifications for owners of 
superfund sites, companies that allegedly polluted such sites, and communities that want to clean 
up Superfund sites quickly.”). 
 149. See Ricci, supra note 29, at 18.  This theory attributes the DOJ’s position to a desire to 
insulate the Department of Defense from contribution liability. Perhaps the most conspiratorial 
theory is that the DOJ’s position was driven by a desire to gut the Superfund program.  The logic 
of this theory is that the construction of the statute that the DOJ advocated and the Supreme Court 
adopted will act as a strong disincentive to voluntary investigations and cleanups.  At the same 
time, federal budget deficits coupled with Congress’ refusal to reinstate the tax that had initially 
funded the Superfund program, will severely hamper the government’s ability to conduct 
cleanups on its own or bring the civil actions which are now a predicate to contribution actions 
under § 113.  This combination of events, over time, could bring the Superfund program to a 
grinding halt. 
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Limiting the government’s liability and failing to protect the health and 
safety of its citizens seem to stem further back than the judiciary.  Congress 
enacted CERCLA with enough room for interpretation to result in the ruling of 
Cooper Industries.  Amending CERCLA to specifically allow contribution 
suits under § 113 without a PRP being sued by the EPA under §§ 106 or 107 is 
the rational way to correct this inadvertent error. 
CONCLUSION 
A number of commentators have speculated that the decision in Cooper 
Industries is going to slow the cleanup of contaminated sites.150  Prior to 
Cooper Industries, a property owner who discovers that his property might be 
contaminated would often voluntarily investigate and remediate his site to 
avoid being the target of a government action, knowing that he would be able 
to recover at least part of the costs of cleanup from other potentially 
responsible parties.  However, after Cooper Industries, the property owner has 
no incentive to move expeditiously.  If he acts voluntarily, he now has to bear 
the cost of cleanup alone.  Because Congress has not reauthorized the 
Superfund tax, there is even less money available for remediation under 
CERCLA, and thus the number of actions filed by the federal government is 
likely to increase, and consequently, more sites will go unremediated for 
longer amounts of time.  Also, given the current administration’s less than 
aggressive attitude toward enforcement, firms are not likely to be motivated by 
fear of enforcement to clean up unremediate sites voluntarily.151 
The parties most adversely affected by the decision, of course, are those 
PRPs who relied on existing case law, and voluntarily began cleanup action 
 
 150. See, e.g., Richard G. Leland & Toni L. Finger, The Supreme Court’s Limitation on 
Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Superfund: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished—Part I, 
METRO. CORP. COUNS., Apr. 5, 2005, at 16.  Leland and Finger argue: 
The Supreme Court’s decision is likely to discourage PRPs from voluntarily cleaning up 
contaminated sites because they will not be able to recoup their response costs from other 
PRPs under CERCLA.  Rather, PRPs will be relegated to asserting state statutory claims 
or common law claims to recover response costs, which method of recovery is typically 
not preferable, as such claims will not allow PRPs the same degree of access to the 
Federal courts.  To preserve their right to seek contribution under CERCLA and avail 
themselves of the Federal courts, PRPs aware of contamination on their property may be 
apt to wait for government to compel a cleanup or remediate the site and sue for the 
recovery of its response costs.  Given the government’s limited resources and the less-
than-aggressive posture of the Bush Administration (which submitted a brief supporting 
the prevailing party’s decision) in environmental enforcement, many contaminated sites 
that otherwise may have undergone a voluntary cleanup may remain unremediated for 
longer periods of time. 
Id.; see also Robert C. Longstreth, Supreme Court Decision Imperils Voluntary Environmental 
Cleanups, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Mar. 4, 2005). 
 151. Leland & Finger, supra note 150, at 16. 
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and then filed cost recovery claims under CERCLA.  Their options have 
dwindled.  Lower courts, relying on Cooper Industries, have already begun 
dismissing such claims,152 and the remaining state solutions available to them 
are few and far between. 
Because the decision of this case is so inconsistent with the intent of 
Congress in passing CERCLA initially, and because the holding negates many 
of the benefits of the Brownfield Revitalization and Environmental Restoration 
Act, some environmental attorneys believe it is likely that Congress will act to 
limit the impact of the decision in Cooper Industries.153 
There are three possible approaches the legislative fix could take: eliminate 
the words “during or following” from the enabling clause,154 add the word 
“before” in front of that phrase in the statutory language, or amend CERCLA 
to explicitly authorize any potentially responsible party that has incurred 
response costs to seek contribution from any other potentially responsible 
party.  It is time that Congress put the best interests of United States citizens 
and the environment ahead of the interests of the PRPs responsible for the 
creation and unsafe disposal of hazardous waste. 
 
 
 152. See, e.g., Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Schilberg, No. 3:01CV896 (MRK), 
2005 WL 1683494, at *7 (D. Conn. Jul. 19, 2005); City of Waukesha v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 362 F. 
Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition, LLC, 382 F. 
Supp. 2d 1079 (S.D. Ill. 2005). 
 153. Norman Carlin & Andrea L. Courtney, Cooper v. Aviall Decision, MONDAQ BUS. 
BRIEFING (Jan. 26, 2005). 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(F)(1) (2000). 
